This is also strategic. If Panama does not act, it loses revenue and competitiveness. But since 2024, the scenario has changed. More than 140 countries agreed that large multinationals—those with annual revenues exceeding 750 million euros—must pay a minimum effective tax of 15% in every jurisdiction where they generate profits. This raises the key question: if Panama does not collect that 15%, who does? The answer is simple and concerning: it is collected by the countries where the parent companies of these enterprises are located—the United States, Spain, Colombia, or the United Kingdom. This is enough money to finance infrastructure, technical education, or logistics projects linked to the Canal. The International Monetary Fund already warned of this in 2023: if Panama does not adopt the QDMTT, other countries will collect taxes on income generated within its territory. The problem is not just fiscal. Its objective is to prevent multinationals from shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Panama, until now, has not implemented this instrument. Meanwhile, other countries are already doing so. Not for lack of economic activity, but for lack of political will. Imagine a multinational corporation operating in Panama under special regimes—such as the Colon Free Zone or SEM—and paying effective rates of 5% or less. Staying on gray lists and the perception of regulatory lag affect the confidence of investors seeking environments aligned with global standards. The solution is not complex, but it is urgent. Panama can—and must—implement the QDMTT through a simple law, aligned with the OECD model. It is not about creating new tax burdens, but about preventing other countries from continuing to capture revenues generated in Panama. Continuing to postpone this decision is equivalent to ceding strategic resources at a time when the country needs to strengthen its public finances and international credibility. Panama cannot afford to keep losing money due to inaction. The author is a tax consultant. With relatively low investment in digital systems, the country can process information and manage collection without increasing bureaucracy. The question, then, is not whether Panama can do it. The question is why it has not yet done so. The National Assembly and the Ministry of Economy and Finance have a key decision before them. Panama, in turn, receives nothing. This is not a hypothesis. Panama is letting up to 250 million dollars slip away annually. Tax incentives cease to be effective because multinationals will still pay the 15%, but in another jurisdiction. Barbados, for example, has begun to collect tens of millions by applying this regulation. The estimates are clear: Panama could be losing between 220 and 250 million dollars a year. That amount represents more than 0.3% of GDP and around 2% to 3% of corporate income tax revenue. This does not imply increasing taxes, but capturing revenues that are already being taxed in other jurisdictions. Special regimes can remain. The benefit disappears and the reputational cost remains. Additionally, international pressure is increasing. For years, that was a competitive advantage. The QDMTT does not eliminate them; it simply ensures that if a company pays less than the global minimum, the difference is collected locally and not abroad. Furthermore, the technical implementation is viable. It is a regulatory reality. The mechanism is known as the Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) and is part of the OECD's international Pillar Two framework. This is not a small figure.
