Panama has the most to gain from this infrastructure, particularly in containers and high-value logistics cargo, but not in all flows equally. However, competition has become more demanding. In other words, institutional quality also plays a role. In this new environment, Panama can compete with its dry canal, whose law was approved in March 2024. Mexico stands out for its proximity, manufacturing integration, land connectivity, and the USMCA framework. The relevant question is no longer whether Panama is important, but under what conditions it will continue to be important tomorrow and with what institutional risk premium. This is where the most delicate point for public policy comes in. They can complement the Canal, increase the optionality of the Panama system, and provide an operational valve in scenarios of congestion, water restrictions, or external shocks. For Panama, this raises the cost of ambiguity while increasing the value of credibility. If Panama does not reduce its geopolitical and operational frictions, it will lose opportunities. If a portion of the production that used to travel from Asia to the United States begins to shift to Mexico, Central America, or the expanded Caribbean, then a portion of long-distance maritime traffic will tend to change. This does not mean that the Panama Canal will automatically lose its structural relevance. The second is the physical and institutional connection to that market. Total reshoring to the United States is slow, costly, and, in numerous sectors, not very realistic on a large scale. Panama can win, but only if it understands that its strategic product has changed. But not by inertia, not by geography, and not by the simple existence of the Canal, but by deliberately deciding to become the most reliable platform in a region that is reorganizing. That is, nearshoring not only relocates factories: it also reorders the modal map of trade to the United States. For this reason, Panama cannot read this phenomenon with past categories. But what is actually happening is a selective, gradual, and strategic relocation of production and service segments, driven by a new equation in which the abstract promises of extreme efficiency weigh less and resilience, supply chain security, access to the US market, and the reduction of geopolitical and operational frictions weigh much more. The evidence shows that Latin America has already moved beyond the purely narrative phase. A massive and immediate return of all manufacturing to the United States is not observed, nor is a complete substitution of Asia. One must offer reliable electricity, security, logistics infrastructure, railway capacity, port access, clear rules, and political stability. It competes with Mexican multimodal corridors, with expanding ports like Santos, Chancay, or San Antonio, and with a region that offers increasingly more alternatives for shipping lines. The third are operational and geopolitical frictions. Panama no longer competes only with other canals. Mexico has consolidated itself as the main node of this productive regionalization oriented towards the United States. We saw this after the Canal expansion when the lack of focus on capturing the benefits of the expansion caused the loss of opportunities to other countries like Colombia, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. Before getting distracted with non-priority projects, Panama needs to shield the essentials: water for the Canal, solid port governance, legal security, integrated logistics infrastructure, digitalization, traceability, cybersecurity, and an international reputation as a neutral, stable, and predictable hub. In this sense, reshoring and nearshoring advance slowly but surely and reward countries that combine market access, functional connection with the United States, and low geopolitical and operational frictions. When companies decide to relocate, they don't just look at wages. The country no longer just sells miles saved; it sells the reduction of geopolitical and operational friction. It is no longer enough to say that the country has a privileged geographical position. But its usefulness depends on the type of cargo. For dry bulk, the equation is much more complex: volumes are larger, unit margins are lower, and economies of scale tend to favor direct maritime movement. This is not just a statistical anecdote: it is a clear signal that value chains are already changing concretely. At a sectoral level, this is more than just light manufacturing. It does not mean the end of globalization; it means its reorganization. This can be a smart decision, but only if it is done with technical criteria and not as a slogan. In containers, especially in regional trade, transshipment, time-sensitive cargo, or movements that require logistical redundancy, robust dry canals can provide flexibility, resilience, and response capacity. But the railway is gaining ground because it is 3 to 4 times more fuel-efficient than the truck as a connector for internal production with the north. and the maritime and industrial port strategy of the EU clearly show that the system is no longer organized just for efficiency, but for efficiency plus resilience, security, and control. The country must focus on improving its business practices seeking to maximize the benefit for all Panamanians, and not for a few, as have demonstrated the concession contracts that have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice. That is why the government should concentrate on reducing corruption, strengthening the logistics-maritime sector and not disperse its efforts. The country's strategic priority should not be diluted in agendas that absorb political capital without raising the systemic competitiveness of the hub. The first is the size of the market. In current trade, the cost no longer ends at freight. Geography still matters, but it no longer guarantees value capture by itself. They evaluate transit time, institutional quality, rules of origin, security, energy, traceability, regulatory stability, and fast access to the final consumer. That is the bottom line. Not necessarily due to a spectacular rupture, but due to a gradual deterioration of its relative attractiveness. In an environment where the United States and the European Union are increasing the weight of economic security, port governance, cyber-resilience, traceability, and reliable suppliers, logistics nodes will be evaluated with tougher criteria. The problem is not one of existence; it is one of strategic sufficiency. This means that the demand pattern changes at the margin and that certain long ocean routes may be partially substituted by shorter land, rail, air, or sea combinations. At the transport modality level, approximately 73% of the freight between Mexico and the United States moves by truck. In that segment, the dry land corridor is harder to justify. The United States remains the great magnet with high purchasing power and consumption. It is necessary to strengthen the existing interoceanic land corridor and develop new complementary dry corridors in Chiriquí, in Coclé, and elsewhere. On the other hand, it introduces a real strategic pressure. Mexico's participation in US manufacturing imports rose from 14% in 2021 to 16% in 2025, while China's fell below 10%. In Laredo, the main inland port of that trade, the cross-border exchange by road reached US$87.6 billion in January 2026. Many companies are adopting hybrid models: they keep part of the production in Asia (China+1) and regionalize another part in North America or Latin America to reduce vulnerabilities. This does not mean that Panama ceased to be a real hub. Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic are consolidating as poles for medical devices; Colombia is gaining relevance as a hub for global services and technology; and El Salvador appears on the radar for electronic assembly and medical manufacturing, leveraging its air proximity to US cities and the CAFTA-DR. It is no coincidence. They do not advance with the speed of the headlines, but with enough constancy to reorder investment, production, and logistics in the hemisphere. That is the opportunity and also the historical test to keep us competitive and ensure our future in this changing world. Author Eddie Tapiero is an economist. The opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author. Air transport, although much smaller, serves for urgent and high-value cargo, especially technological and medical. The evidence shows that the sustained growth of nearshoring depends precisely on solving bottlenecks in energy, security, and port and railway infrastructure. For Panama, this transformation has a double meaning. That is why nearshoring has become the most functional intermediate solution. Foxconn expanded its capacity in Mexico with an investment of US$168 million in artificial intelligence servers. They cannot be considered as a position of this medium. Panama has a Canal, ports, a railway, transshipment, and extraordinary hemispheric connectivity. It does not eliminate Asia; it complements it. Panama can win. and nearshoring (bringing manufacturing closer to countries near the US). There the future map is largely defined. It is not enough to be relatively close. At the same time, Mexican exports of information technology hardware to the United States reached US$84 billion in the first ten months of 2025, with a year-on-year growth of 75%. On the other hand, it opens a window. Wasion Holdings turned its operation in Mexico into a strategic regional center with annual deliveries exceeding RMB 1 billion, while TT Electronics and HARTING expanded capacities in Mexicali and Mexico, respectively. The impact extends beyond Mexico. The automotive sector maintains investments estimated above US$9 billion for 2025. It includes compliance, traceability, cybersecurity, regulatory reliability, contractual stability, operational continuity, and even the reputation of the logistics node. NOV, for its part, announced an investment close to US$200 million to double in Brazil its capacity for flexible submarine pipe manufacturing by 2029. PepsiCo announced US$467 million for a new plant in Celaya, within a plan of US$2 billion for 2025-2028. There is greater investment in electronics, industrial components, data infrastructure, aerospace, medical devices, automotive, energy, BPO, and technology services. Services like the Mexico Midwest Express connect Monterrey with Chicago in about four days, with competitive times compared to traditional land transport. It continues to be so. The maritime policy of the US. Eddie Tapiero The reshoring (bringing manufacturing back to the US). According to recent surveys, more than 51% of business leaders plan to diversify suppliers in 2026, and the dominant logic is no longer just 'just in time,' but increasingly 'just in case.' Three variables help to understand who wins and who is left behind in this process. US). US). US).
